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Responsibility for Dealing with Intelligence Leaks										
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Security Committee

SECOM-D-114

25 May 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence					
VIA:	Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff					
FROM:	Chairman					

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SUBJECT:

1. A brief colloquy during a recent SIG-I meeting has resulted in some confusion about the role of your Security Committee and its Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee (UDIS), and we would very much appreciate a clarification.

Responsibility for Dealing with Intelligence Leaks

- 2. The minutes of the 27 April 1984 Senior Interagency Group (Intelligence) recount that after CIA/OGC, explained the extreme difficulty in trying to track a leak across the entire Intelligence Community, "General Stilwell said that the IG/CM should re-address this entire subject and come up with a set of practical recommendations. He said that the IG/CM would undertake this task in coordination with the IG/CI."
- 3. The Department of Justice (Criminal Division and FBI) and Department of Defense (OSD, the services and DIS) representatives to the UDIS have expressed the belief that your tasking of General Stilwell in this regard affects the role and mission of the UDIS. They believe that this tasking means that UDIS should not undertake any new initiatives and that General Stilwell and not the Security Committee now has responsibility in this field. As you know, UDIS currently is working on a study of leaks and is attempting to come up with practical recommendations to deal with leak problems.

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4. Neither I, as Chairman of the Security Committee, nor Chairman of the UDIS, had understood your assent to General Stilwell's proposal to mean that there was to be a diminution in the role assigned to the Security Committee or the UDIS under DCID 1/11. Given the confusion that has resulted, however, a brief statement in this regard would be extremely helpful. A proposed memorandum from you to General Stilwell is attached for your signature.

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
Attachment: Memorandum

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Approved For Release 2009/03/23: CIA-RDP94B00280R001200020001-3

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505



29 MAY 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT:

Unauthorized Disclosures of Intelligence

April 1984 meeting of the Senior Interagency Group (Intelligence) has led to some question as to whether my acceptance of your offer of assistance on the problem of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence information had, in effect, transferred responsibility for dealing with unauthorized disclosures from the Security Committee and the Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee (UDIS) to you.

- 2. It is my intention that the DCID 1/11 responsibilities for unauthorized disclosures remain with my Security Committee and the UDIS. It is my desire that these bodies not only continue their existing initiatives, but that they actively explore all possible avenues to alleviate the leak problem. I wish the UDIS to continue to review the problems of unauthorized disclosures and provide me with practical recommendations to deal with this important issue.
- 3. I, of course, very much appreciate your input on this problem and hope you will provide to my Security Committee any ideas or proposals which your staff may develop.

/s/ Bill

William J. Casey

cc: C/Security Committee

CL BY SIGNER DECL OADR